Kissinger’s Back-Channel Diplomacy: Taiwan’s existential Crisis

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1618401887945" alt="South Korea, a front runner for Quad+?" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin participated in another kind of bilateral “two-plus-two” (foreign and defence ministerial) meetings in Japan and South Korea in March.
The visits marked the “first Cabinet-level, in-person, overseas travel of the Biden-Harris administration,” which came in power early this year. Displaying the priorities of US towards the Asia-pacific region, this was also the first meeting with US’ Asian allies.
The visit was subsequently followed by the first-ever Quad summit, virtually between US and its <a href="https://policharcha.com/article/internationalrelations/a08b9462-ab09-4d42-be8f-040db0beb017/importance-of-indopacific-in-the-new-multipolar-world-order?fbclid=IwAR0gP06Dvw_-VHrQ7yOZra81nk2k2N28musvpOPxYSjOgrcP4PO2H9sO2AM" target="_blank">Indo-pacific</a> partners i.e. India, Japan, and Australia, signifying the crucial nature of visits to South Korea and Japan.

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1618401964955" alt="South Korea, a front runner for Quad+?" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

Statement by Seoul said, “the ROK-US Alliance serves as the linchpin of peace, security and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and the <a href="https://policharcha.com/article/internationalrelations/a08b9462-ab09-4d42-be8f-040db0beb017/importance-of-indopacific-in-the-new-multipolar-world-order?fbclid=IwAR0gP06Dvw_-VHrQ7yOZra81nk2k2N28musvpOPxYSjOgrcP4PO2H9sO2AM" target="_blank">Indo-Pacific region</a>,” while statement from Tokyo read, “the US-Japan Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”
The US traditionally described its alliance with Seoul as the linchpin of peace and prosperity only in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
Now the noticeable difference in the relations between Seoul and Washington is a change of theatre as South Korea seems to have accepted the reality that the US prioritising the Indo-pacific region in its foreign policy. Seoul knows that US’ position is unlikely to change due to the arrival of a bigger threat than North Korea in the region, People’s Republic of China.
Japan and the United States are committed to promote a free and open Indo-pacific and rules-based International order, and Korea will provide more weight to its ‘New Southern Policy’ focused on India and Southeast Asia to co-operate with the US and allies. China does not seem to be a threat to Korea’s interest, at least not at the level where Seoul would redirect its resources to contain Beijing, like Quad.
<ins>Why is South Korea reluctant to join the Quad?</ins>
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue resurrected after a fallout among countries a decade ago due to the China’s growing power in the region, but South Korea is not a party to Quad despite being a thriving democracy, promoter of free market, and most importantly, a treaty ally with the US in the Indo-pacific region.

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1618402046676" alt="South Korea, a front runner for Quad+?" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

Coronavirus pandemic, further, strengthened the idea of Quad to even convert it into alliance on the lines of NATO. The South Korean President Moon in the meeting with President Trump in 2017 said that, “Japan initiated the free and open Indo-Pacific idea, and it does not seem right for South Korea to join in the plan.”
The left-leaning Moon Jae-In government came to power after former President Park’s impeachment which resurfaced the colonial period issue in the domestic politics, and resultantly worsening the bilateral ties between the Japan and South Korea, two neighbours in East Asia Sea.
<ins>South Korea and Japan</ins>
In October 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea affirmed the right of a group of Korean citizens to sue three Japanese companies for damages stemming from forced labour subjected upon Korean nationals in mining factories during the 1910–45 Japanese occupation to which Japan responded that the issue was settled back in the 1965 Japan-Korea normalisation treaty.
According to the said treaty, Tokyo agreed to pay and provide loans as compensation. The Supreme court ruling reversed course by asserting that the 1965 treaty was a political agreement between governments and did not preclude the rights of individuals to sue the companies for damages.
The ruling did not bode well with Japan, and a spillover effect was seen in other areas that created geopolitical tensions between the nations. In response, Japan removed South Korea from its “white list” in 2019 that restricted Seoul to import sensitive Japanese goods, including chemicals used for making key products such as flat-screen televisions and semiconductors.
South Korea retaliated by taking Japan off its “white list” for fast-track trade status, marking the beginning of the trade spat between both the countries. In that same year, South Korea threatened to walk out from the General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA), a pact signed between Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington for the effective sharing of intelligence related to North Korean ballistic missile developments.
<ins>South Korea and United States</ins>
The Trump administration rejuvenated Quad to confront and contain China. US masqueraded behind the concepts of free and open pacific and rules-based order to make the Quad legitimate and acceptable to countries.
To some extent, principles proposed by US to align with nations can be true, but deep-down the strategic reason for Quad 2.0 is China.
US and its allies are looking for measures to curb the expansionist China policies – be it in Himalayas (Doklam confrontation with India), Senkaku Islands (dispute with Japan), political meddling in Australia, an existential threat to Taiwan due to China’s dominance in South China Sea, Beijing’s malicious activities in the region infringing sovereignty of neighbouring nations, and obviously the trade war with the United States.
These issues, directly or indirectly, threatened the national interest of the US, and in all cases, China was on the on the opposite side of spectrum making it an adversary. Seoul, though, does not see it that way as its foreign policy do not allow it to confront China or participate in the grouping formed in the wake of rise of expansionist China. Seoul was concerned that Quad could grow as anti-China coalition which would make the Quad as a part of zero-sum game, and from the perspective of Seoul, economic and security interests of South Korea would come at stake if it joined the Quad.
South Korea has already witnessed the wrath of China in economic sphere when it agreed to install a US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) anti-missile battery in July 2016 after the speculations that North Korea had tested the ballistic missile with Nuclear warheads creating a survival threat to the South Korea.
Beijing went ballistic after this move of South Korea just few miles off its coast, stating that system’s radars could snoop on its own defences and speculated that system was installed to intimidate China. A barrage of verbal broadsides was unleashed, but with China now being South Korea’s leading trade partner, a more damaging weapon was unsheathed – economic retaliation, though under-reported at present, this dynamic continues to impact Korean business to this day.
Trump came to power on the promises that it would put American interests first and foremost, especially, the economic interest. The ‘America first’ campaign rhetoric took shape as soon as he entered into White House. On the first day in office, Trump announced that US would no longer remain participant to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and then, President Trump’s absence from the ASEAN summit in November of 2018 sent strong doubts related to US’ commitment to the region.
Similarly, Trump’s threats on imposing tariffs on Japanese automobiles were particularly unsettling for Japan which was perceived negatively among Korean businesses as they fear that US could also direct the guns of protectionist policies towards Seoul which could hurt its economy that was already facing China’s wrath.&nbsp;
There were initial tensions raised due to the then presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rhetoric on making sure allies pay their share of the burden and talks on allowing South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons. In addition to the ‘make them pay’ rhetoric, the withdrawal of troops in Syria adds to the uncertainty in US commitment to its allies.
South Korea felt that US could abandon it in the need of an hour. The USA had also halted the annual military exercise it holds with South Korea, then resuming the drill in a modified and smaller-scale in April 2019. South Korea had serious commitment issues with the US during Trump-era and amidst all these, joining Quad Plus could have been prove last nail in the coffin.
Trump administration made enormous efforts to pressurise South Korea to take concrete steps with regard to China. Steps which would align with US interests; notably, ban on Huawei’s 5G technology to establish in South Korea. The security alliance between Seoul and Washington spilled over to economic sphere in trump period beginning the tiresome cycle of pressure and resistance which discorded the crucial alliance for US in Asia-pacific region.
The Moon government, representing the left-liberal ideology, believed that US was compelling Korean Government to work in the favour of the former’s national interests, and not on the mutual interests.
US pressured Seoul to pursue policies based on America-first approach which was infringement on the national sovereignty and direct threat to the autonomy of Seoul in taking decisions in international relations. The widening fissure in the US-South Korea alliance throughout the Trump era serves as a valuable lesson to the Biden administration that pressuring Seoul is counterproductive.
<ins>Shift from Trump-Era to Biden-Era – Bid for more stability</ins>

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1618402317140" alt="South Korea, a front runner for Quad+?" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>


The Joe Biden administration do not see the Quad as grouping to contain China in classical terms, but as a coalition of like-minded countries supporting a market economy across nations, and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
This was reiterated by the fact that ‘China’ was not even mentioned once in the joint statement after the first-ever Quad summit in March 2021. In some scenario, if Quad expanded, that would be a grouping based on shared values. Therefore, the common ground would not be explicitly to “confront China”, but to “establish institutional rules-based order.”
The re-joining to WHO on the first day in office, and serious commitment towards climate change indicate that China would be priority for Biden administration, and even for Quad, but not before the aforementioned issues – a proposition that Seoul can support.
In fact, last year South Korea did not hesitate to join ad hoc Quad+ meetings focusing on sharing knowledge about the COVID-19 pandemic. These meetings also involved New Zealand and Vietnam, two other countries usually discussed as potential Quad+ members, along with Indonesia.
In other words, past experience suggests that the Quad+ would focus on cooperation among its members and involve several countries with a more nuanced approach towards China. If the Biden administration builds on this template, this would work well for South Korea.
South Korea have bitter relationship with Japan that could be resolved if Biden administration would increase its commitment with both the countries, militarily and economically. This would impede the fear of abandonment arise during Trump administration and consequently, will make South Korea less dependent on China. In the contentious military-security realm, South Korea would likely play it very safe, but room for co-operation is not totally absent.
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South Korea, a front runner for Quad+?

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1615369762269" alt="Situation worsens in Yemen with mounting Proxy Wars in Middle East" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

In the latest developments, which seem like another episode of counterattacks happening since 2015 between the Houthi rebels and Saudi-led military coalition in the Yemen Civil War, Houthis have targeted the Saudi’s capital Riyadh with ballistic missiles and drones, as confirmed by Saudi state television.
Houthi Rebels’ spokesperson threatened that their operations will continue and become more hostile against enemy forces until external powers cease the siege on Yemen. Houthi rebels escalated the attacks on Saudi Kingdom implementing their strategy to capture the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s last bastion, Marib, in the northern Yemen, where rebel positions were pounded by defensive forces using air strikes sponsored by Kingdom.
The attack was thwarted by Saudi as it destroyed a bomb-laden drone launched towards border city Khamis Mushait in south-west Saudi. The latest series of events have made chances of de-escalation almost negligible, and to make matters worse, have led Saudi-led military coalition to be more aggressive. This would just increase the pile of bodies on ground.
Based in Sa’dah (city in North-West Yemen), Ansar Allah, which is also known as the Houthi Movement, has battled for power with the internationally recognised Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG).
ROYG has been aided militarily by Saudi Arabia, and, until its 2019 troop withdrawal, the United Arab Emirates. As of late 2020, the epicentre of fighting has been around the Yemen’s northern governorate and the city of Marib, which is one of the last Yemeni areas under the control of the ROYG. Marib also contains Yemen’s modest oil and gas reserves.
The Houthis have been pressing ROYG forces along three fronts, but Saudi airstrikes have somewhat slowed Houthi advances. Tribal forces aligned with the ROYG also have stymied the Houthis from seizing Marib city. Several of these local tribes have strong ties with Saudi Arabia, and have co-ordinated with Saudi forces to repel the Houthi offensive. The Houthis have suffered several notable casualties, including one Hezbollah-trained Houthi commander, who was a close confidant of Houthi leader Abdul Malek al Houthi.
<ins>Yemen War - How did it start and who are the Houthis?</ins>

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1615369881912" alt="Situation worsens in Yemen with mounting Proxy Wars in Middle East" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

Rise of pro-democracy movements, also referred to as Arab Spring, in 2011 witnessed the toppling of power in several West Asian and North African countries – a region also called Middle East by western scholars.
One such country was Yemen where President Ali Abdullah Saleh was dethroned after ruling unified Yemen for over two decades. President Saleh’s resignation destabilised the de facto balance in the country which further created local centres of power by various internal militant groups. Most of these groups were formed by tribal population which took up arms to maintain their authority and autonomy. This led to multiple armed conflicts that torn the country apart and eroded central governance in Yemen.
The Houthi rebellion, consisted of majorly Shiite rebels, raised up against Sunni government, demanding lower fuel prices, and a change in regime. Dismayed by seeing the demands not meeting, the Houthis allied with parts of the Yemeni military and stormed the capital, Sana’a. They took control of the capital, forcing the internationally recognised government into exile which further started the Yemen’s civil war in 2014.
In 2015, after the negotiations between Houthis and government failed, rebels seized the presidential palace leading President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to resign. This was followed by a military campaign launched by Saudi Arabia with other gulf states to eliminate the Houthis forces using air strikes and economic isolation using US’ logistical and intelligence assistance in order to restore the government.
A UN brokered peace deal talks stalled in the summer of ’16 between Houthis and Yemeni government. Former president Saleh, ousted in 2011, joined hands with Houthis to form a “political council” to govern Sana’a and much of northern Yemen against a common enemy. The co-operation, however, could not even last longer than a year.&nbsp;
Saleh broke with the Houthis, and announced to fight against them along with his followers, mostly the tribal clans around Sana’a, but Saleh’s forces got defeated in mere two days. Death of Saleh eliminated the main political competitor of Houthis in the north Yemen which gave more legitimacy to the rebel forces to rule and fight against Yemeni government.
<ins>Iran and US proxy war</ins>
The dissolution of territorial integrity of Yemen and subsequent collapse of state institutions created the geo-political implications which paved the way for international actors to enter into the war through supporting different factions fighting in the Yemen.
The situation alarmed the United States and other actors in the international community which feared that state failure may empower transnational terrorist groups active in the region and they will try to destabilise the vital international shipping lanes near Bab-el-Mandeb strait. The Bab-el-Mandeb strait, after Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, is one of the world’s busiest chokepoints in terms of volume of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported through each day.
The US was more concerned about the role Iran will play to increase its regional power by supporting Houthis and destabilise the region as the collapsed state would provide an opportunity to Iran to threaten Saudi Arabia’s borders, which is a strategic ally of the US in the Middle East.&nbsp;
The Houthi movement is a predominantly Zaydi Shia revivalist political and insurgent movement, whose history goes back to 740 CE when Zaydis revolted against Caliphate. Zaydis believed that the Caliphate is corrupt, and to this day, they hold that it is their religious duty to rebel against unjust rulers.&nbsp;
Zaydism is an offshoot of Shia Islam which gives the historical and cultural reason to Iran – the de facto leader of Shiite Islam of the world – to support the Houthis in conflict, apart from taking geo-strategic advantages.
The Houthis have fought six wars in northern Yemen against their Sunni-dominated central government after 2004 under the leadership of Houthi family which revived the Houthi movement by forming the Yemeni governorate of Sa’dah (in the mountainous district of Marran). They also became politically active by propagating the anti-government agenda while successfully mobilising the aggrieved population in a war-torn and neglected north.
The Houthi uprising originally began to end the Saudi-backed efforts to marginalise Zyadi communities and beliefs, but its scope and ambition expanded in the wake of Arab Spring. Subsequently, the movement turned into an anti-establishment one, and eventually wanted to overthrow the Saleh regime.
On the other side, apart from re-establishing the friendly regime in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has another reason to enter into the War.
During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia’s leaders supported northern Yemeni Zaydis as a bulwark against nationalist and leftist rivals, and engaged in proxy war against Egypt-backed Yemeni nationalists during the 1960s.
The revolutionary, anti-Saudi ideology of the Houthi movement, which emerged in the 1990s after the unification in 1990, presented new challenges. The rebellion even fought the civil war in 1994, and came under the rule of strongman Saleh who once described governing his nation’s myriad of tribal groups, militant groups, and alliances as “dancing on the heads of snakes.”
In 2009, Saudi Arabia launched a three-month air and ground campaign in support of the Yemeni government’s Operation Scorched Earth which ended with Saudi Arabia agreeing to the cease-fire with Houthis in 2010 after losing the lives of 133 soldiers.
Saudi Arabia believes that Houthis are the frontline warriors, who are not fighting for their own cause only, but in a broader context, embody what Iran seeks to achieve across the Arab world i.e. the cultivation of armed non-state, non-Sunni actors to pressurise the Iran’s adversaries politically and militarily like Hezbollah in Lebanon to counter Israeli interests.

Also read: <a href="https://policharcha.com/article/internationalrelations/cfc0ae61-5817-41fd-a0b4-c5106b1cff2d/bidens-chance-to-stabilise-usiran-relations-post-trumpera" target="_blank">Biden’s chance to stabilise US-Iran relations post Trump-Era</a>&nbsp;

Iran is supporting the Zyadi-Shia Muslim Houthis by providing critical expertise and equipment to assist the Houthi missile program that targets the Saudi cities, military bases, and oil facilities. Houthis fired cruise missiles into Saudi territory and damaged a Saudi Aramco oil distribution station in Jeddah in November 2019, a major port located on Saudi Arabia’s western coast. Without Iran’s assistance, it was highly unlikely for Houthis to fight the war with Saudi-led military coalition, which was armed with highly advanced US arms technology.
Apart from motivations Iran had, it is the only internationally recognised nation-state to recognise the Houthi government to exert its influence in Sana’a.

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1615370070248" alt="Situation worsens in Yemen with mounting Proxy Wars in Middle East" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

There is another conflict going inside Yemen War far from North and Houthis which directly involves the US strategic interest. The stronghold of non-state actor called Al-Qaeda in certain areas of Arabian Peninsula concerns Washington. Al-Qaeda is considered by the US to be the most dangerous militant franchise which attacked USS Cole off Yemen’s port city of Aden, killing 17 American sailors. This is the same terrorist organisation that carried out 9/11 attacks, the biggest on American soil.
From George Bush to Trump, every US President was directly or indirectly involved in conflicts on the land of Yemen. US soldiers were present during Saleh’s regime in Yemen, involving directly. Washington sold bombs and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia that Kingdom used against Houthi insurgency to aid the Yemeni-governmental forces, involving indirectly.
Obama administration in 2015 offered USS targeting assistance to Riyadh’s command and control that was supposed to minimise the civilian casualties, but it did not and eventually, Obama rolled back the program, but Trump resumed the assistance to Saudi in war efforts by selling weapons worth of billions of dollars.
<ins>The Collapsed State</ins>
Beyond geo-strategic concerns, the collapse of Yemeni institutions during wartime has exacerbated poor living conditions in the most impoverished Arab country, leading to what is now considered the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”
<ins>Look at some figures which will do justice with above statement.</ins>
UN estimated that war has killed 1,30,000 people since it began, including 15,000 civilians. 22 million Yemenis are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, eight million are at the risk of famine, and a cholera outbreak has affected over a million people.
Innumerable children are suffering from malnutrition, and every faction involved in the conflict have violated human rights and international humanitarian law. Infrastructure is the first casualty in the war as the Saudi-led coalition’s continuous air strikes have heavily damaged Yemen’s infrastructure, including a crucial seaport, and important bridges as well as hospitals, sewage facilities, and civilian factories.
Crucial services on which population have depended for their subsistence are gone, destruction is the only thing one can see standing on the ground which has undermined the country’s already weak economy. Repeated closure of airports and crucial sea ports by different parties, whoever holds the control, have made it harder for humanitarian organisation to bring in and distribute aid, and fly wounded Yemenis for treatment.
Cholera, a bacterial infection spread by water contaminated with feces, got the fertile environment to turn lives of Yemenis miserable. First world countries do not acknowledge these diseases as it is not life-threatening disease for them, but the third world, especially the war-torn countries, are the hub of such type of diseases which are killing more people than war itself. The world community, international institutions, and the so-called super powers are watching silently while Yemen is burning to ashes.&nbsp;
Again, the United Nations has called the situation the world’s largest humanitarian crisis for a reason. With more than 10 million people who require immediate assistance, the situation can become even worse, if necessary steps are not taken by the involved parties.&nbsp;
<ins>Trump-Era actions led to prolonged War</ins>
In the last hours, Trump State Department designated the Houthis, backed by Iran, as Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). This move was more of a political act, than a technical one, to create a roadblock for coming administration to reverse the decision as removing the designation is a very difficult political and bureaucratic process.
The designation of FTO comes with the certain implications. Branding the Houthis as terrorists would be an attempt to block the Biden administration and international community to conduct dialogue of any kind with them. The reality is the Houthis control most of northern Yemen, so it is better to deal directly with them than to live in denial.
Having more outside contact with the rebels will help alternative voices to influence them. It will also hamper the efforts of humanitarian relief organisations to get food and medicine to Yemeni civilians living in the territory that the rebels’ control.
<ins>Conclusion</ins>
Positive side is Trump-era has gone and new administration in the White House has decided to end the US support for Kingdom’s war in Yemen. This move conveys that Trump’s open support to Riyadh was a matter of the past, and Biden administration is here to end the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, but it will not be easy road to walk.
President Biden’s move to end support to Saudi is to pressurise Riyadh to back out its military coalition forces from Yemen, just like in the summer of 2019, UAE unilaterally pulled out its ground forces facing a perceived threat from Iran, and receiving international criticism of its conduct in Yemen.
However, later Biden has made a point to say the US would “continue to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity and its people” which indicates that current Biden administration is no mood to abandon its historical ally in the Middle East.&nbsp;
The only way to end this “lose-lose” battle, to end the famine staring on Yemen, to end the misery of millions of people stuck in this endless conflict, and to end this permanent war is that Saudi-led military coalition should end the blockade and initiate talks with Yemen’s multiple rebel factions.

Situation worsens in Yemen with mounting Proxy Wars in Middle East

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1614953193426" alt="History of Myanmar: Transformation from Military rule to Disciplined Democracy." style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

The military once again hold the reins in Myanmar. Citing constitutional provisions that give the military control in national emergencies, on February 1, army officers had detained government leaders, including state counsellor and popular national leader Aung San Suu Kyi. An announcement on military television said the move was in response to “fraud” during last year’s general election. A spokesman said power has been handed to the army’s commander-in-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, who would hold power for one year, and after which there would be new elections.
<a href="https://policharcha.com/article/internationalrelations/3d515a59-a107-451d-8e0d-8806375eaba6/india-needs-to-be-cautious-about-china-while-dealing-with-myanmar" target="_blank">Why this event has become a geopolitical issue worth creating instability in the South Asian region? </a> Is it the debate all about military rule being ‘bad’ and democracy ‘good’? China termed the coup as ‘cabinet reshuffle’, while Biden’s statement took us back to the debate between military regimes and democracy (in American terms).
<ins>West Imposition?</ins>
President’s Biden first response in the aftermath of coup in Myanmar displays US’ historic desperation to impose, rather than peacefully propagate democracy on every nation-state present on the world map. He announced that he will sanction Myanmar’s military leaders for staging a coup in South Asian country, and said “we are going to impose strong exports controls. We are freezing US assets that benefit the Burmese government, while maintaining our support for health care, civil society groups, and other areas that benefit the people of Burma directly.”
Throughout the western world, but particularly and most obviously in the United States, political rhetoric and practice are based upon four seemingly unexceptionable propositions:
<ol>
<li>Democracy is an intrinsically good thing.</li>
<li>It has the truest democracy.</li>
<li>It is morally legitimate to impose democracy on others.</li>
<li>It can effectively do so.</li>
</ol>
What are these above mentioned propositions denote or try to convey to the world? Democracy is inherently good, but is US entitled to impose it on others? Or perhaps US thinks itself to be the truest democracy, so it has some right to dictate it to others?

Also read: <a href="https://policharcha.com/article/nation/203170c0-7305-4852-99d5-91fe035d8189/breakdown-of-preamble-of-indian-constitution-meaning-of-democracy" target="_blank">Meaning of democracy in Indian context</a>&nbsp;

United States assumes that it represents the apotheosis of democracy when it has some basic flaws in its democratic system – citizens of the United States do not directly elect their head of the State, meaning it does not have a direct mandate of the majority; resources required to run for office effectively disbar the majority from a political career as politics is a costly business; media and corporate interests, biases, propagandas control the electoral process and outcome in American politics to a very large extent. Apparently, these conclusions stand far away from any plausible notion of rule by the people and for the people.
Democracy is a polymorphous concept which may take numerous forms and in each case be equally a bona fide instance of democracy just like gardening or teaching. Gallie (1955) long ago termed democracy as “equally contested” concept, and what constitutes a true democracy is forever open to argument.
There are no prior grounds for assuming that the particular form of democracy that takes place in the United States (or anywhere else) is ‘truer than’, ‘more democratic than’, or ‘superior to’ various other forms that it has taken historically or takes today in other places.&nbsp;
Does it mean democracy is an abstract concept floating around the world since the Athenian democratic city-state in ancient times, and since the establishment of American constitution, or with the end of French revolution in modern times?
Do nation-states politically democratised just to go with the flow because western nations adopted it? Or the economically powerful, the so-called first world, give these nation-states a chance to enter into the club?
Obviously No! There is a minimal descriptive content that sets limits on what can count as democracy, but countries like US still vouch for it, and sometimes even go to war to establish this political system.
More or less ‘democracy’ means ‘government by the people or by their elected representatives, who are accountable for their actions’. This assertion is contrasted with a government led by either an individual ruler or a minority group which in either case is not answerable to the people as a whole. It is an assumption that individual leader does not or inadequately represent the whole population, violate the rights of one community for others, curtail basic human rights to remain in the power, is not regularly accountable to public, and influences the state’s institutions maliciously.
These assumptions are arrived from historical examples in reality, and not just the perception of reality, but believing that a political system of one-man rule equates to a military regime, and one such example is Myanmar, or what US still calls, Burma.
<ins>Military Regime</ins>

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1614953862669" alt="History of Myanmar: Transformation from Military rule to Disciplined Democracy." style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

Military regime, in layman terms, defined as a ‘system of government governed by the military’, is a form of authoritarian rule, but is distinguished from both democracy, and other forms of authoritarianism.
Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy has suggested the “procedural minimum” definition of democracy which includes four key attributes – free, fair, and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, broad protection of civil liberties (freedom of speech, press and association), and the absence of non-elected “tutelary authorities” that limit the governing power of elected officials.
The political system in which militaries wield the “tutelary powers” or “reserved domains”, but still accept the democratic game can be articulated to be a “tutelary democracy”. It is a system in which no channel exist for oppositional forces to legally contest for executive power. A closed authoritarian regime evolves where democratic institutions does not exist. A hegemonic regime pertains to a system in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper, but are nothing more than a façade, and that is the category in which military regimes falls.&nbsp;
The military regimes can be distinguished on the basis of the level of intervention. In the direct military regime, military forms the government while in the quasi-civilian regimes, military holds political hegemony with a civilian window dressing.
According to Nordlinger, the extent of power of the armed forces, and their political &amp; economic goals define the level of military intervention. He distinguishes three ideal types of military rule.
<ul>
<li>Rulers – Military dominate the regime, control large segments of political and economic aspects of society, and it “intend to bring basic changes in the distribution of power by eliminating all existing power centres”</li>
<li>Guardians – Military control the government from backstage, and informally holds the governmental powers.</li>
<li>Moderators – Military does not hold important offices leaving them to civilian politicians, but maintains veto power over certain policies.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
The longevity of military rule in Myanmar is a function of regime’s preparedness to use lethal force against its opponents with total impunity, and regime’s assiduousness in rewarding its supporters along with its tight control over the economy to grant military and other elites some concessions against its own labyrinthine restrictions and rules on economic activity.
<ins>Myanmar and Tatmadaw</ins>
The Burmese army, established in 1942, also known as Tatmadaw preceded the existence of an independent state. Army became politicised during the freedom struggle against colonisers, becoming a liberating force. It could retrospectively assume the role of guardian of the Burmese state, and bulwark of national independence.
After the departure of Britishers in 1948, Burma was established as a democratic State according to its constitution, but Tatmadaw got deeply involved into civil politics. Even after accepting supremacy of a civilian government, army gradually expanded its political role. The outbreak of ethnic, secessionist, and communist rebellion triggered the institutional modernisation of the armed forces leading to the increased assertiveness of the Burmese military which out-paced the capacities of civilian arm of the government. The military took over the administrative functions, and acquired the significant chunk from national budget (one-third to half) to save the Burma from going through the process of Balkanization.&nbsp;
Late 50s witnessed the turbulent times for politics of Burma when factionalism increased within the ruling Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL). This subsequently led to a split in the party creating instability in the parliamentary system.
General Ne Win urged the civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu to temporarily transfer power to the armed forces which acted as a “Caretaker Government” from 1958 to 1960. This also developed praetorian ethos in the officer corps grounded in the belief that military functions is more effective than its civilian counterparts.
The military brought out some changes at the organisational, operational, and ideological level. It adopted new ideology which defined the role of military in broad national security terms as being responsible for the defence of the national objectives of establishing “peace and the rule of law”, “democracy”, and “socialist economy”. This prepared the groundwork for the “new professionalism” of the Burmese military. It expanded its business activities into the banking sector, construction industry, and fishing, and became the most powerful business organisation in the country.
The “Caretaker Government” handed back the power in February 1960 to the then Prime Minister U Nu, but this honeymoon period did not last long as General Ne Win staged the first Coup d'état in the history of Burma, bringing together high-ranking army officers, and eliminating their civilian counterparts once and for all.
The military was “compelled” to intervene to safeguard the nation from secessionist forces trying to disintegrate the country. Democracy allows dissent to freely propagate, looking for peaceful resolution through dialogue and deliberation, whereas the military rule do not allow this process called “democratic”.
U Nu’s decision to make Buddhism the state religion, calls by ethnic groups for greater autonomy, and secession from the union had laid the groundwork for the intervention of the military to save the country from disintegration.
After ’62, military prevented the emergence of any autonomous centres of influence through the means which termed as ‘un-democratic’. By the same means which shaped the perception that military juntas are malicious to the society, and cannot support the people’s will.
This disadvantage of military regimes, give countries like US the chance or perhaps an excuse to intervene in any country in the name of establishing democracy, or to impose sanctions if the country do not comply to democratic values.
General Ne Win formed a Revolutionary Council, abolished the 1947 constitutions, dissolved parliament, and banned all political parties to name a few “means”. The military regime nationalised the economy under the banner of the “Burmese way of Socialism”, and cut all ties to the outside world. It had also set up its own Leninist party called the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which ran the country unchallenged for over 25 years.&nbsp;
Military regimes thrive on repression; any unbiased examination of military regimes in any country can lead to this conclusion. It is more or less a consistent reality. Myanmar military regime was also no different which has remained in place with the readiness to swiftly and brutally supress dissent.
The coup that installed the military, for the first time, was no doubt relatively a bloodless affair as military cited national security danger, but in the intervening year the regime was quick to put down challenges to its rule with violence. Such suppression has existed as a routine part of everyday life, manifested in an all-pervasive surveillance apparatus.
As of April 2011, Human rights watch reported that there were over 20,000 political prisoners in Myanmar; most of them have been incarcerated and given lengthy sentences under biased legal proceedings and are frequently subjected to torture. Outside of the prisons, the people of Myanmar face limits to their freedom of movement, both domestically and internationally.
Meanwhile, the flow of information is greatly restricted. The press is subject to tight censorship, and the country's perfunctory education system is little more than a vehicle of indoctrination for the military's interpretation of Myanmar’s history. Myanmar's universities were broken up long ago, and their faculties were geographically dispersed to prevent student concentration and activism.
1988 events of widespread uprisings when many thousands of demonstrators were killed or imprisoned or fled the country after Military came hard-handily to suppress the dissent. The events revealed one of the most dangerous faces of military regimes through the episodes of state-sponsored military violence against its own dissenting citizens.
UIS’ (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) data centre suggested that Myanmar’s state spending on education was the lowest in the world in 2000 with a little more than 0.57 per cent of GDP. This showcased another characteristic of military regimes which democratic countries accuse them of.&nbsp;
The military returned to civilian rule only after it succeeded in designing a political system that safeguarded its own core interests. The political changes fell short of a genuine democratic transition, since the military remains fully in control of the political system after having successfully manipulated the 2010 elections. Additionally, it has managed to orchestrate this transition process at every single stage. The military has continuously restricted political space so that oppositional forces have virtually no room to manoeuvre.
<ins>Disciplined Democracy</ins>
Officially announced in the late 2003 by General Khin Nyunt, the military’s roadmap to “disciplined democracy” envisioned the installation of a new political system step by step. Beginning with the reconvening the National Convention to finalise the Constitution’s basic principles which were introduced at the 1993 National Convention. Like the first National Convention (1993–1996), the second was “marred by a lack of inclusiveness, heavy restrictions on public debate, and little input by the participants into the final product”, including the two main opposition parties – the NLD and the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD).
The new constitution enshrined military control, codified the military’s leading role in the participation of the state which was finalised in February 2008, and was formally approved by the national referendum – apparently a highly manipulative one.
Although it established a multiparty democracy allowing for elections for national and regional assemblies, the military still maintained the dominant role in the years to come. Of all regional and national parliament seats, 25 per cent are reserved for the military, and security-related ministries like, defence, border affairs, and home affairs were also bagged by the military.
Military controls the whole security related matters, and is a fully autonomous organisation which is neither subjected to judicial and legislative control, nor accountable for its actions, both publically and judicially.
The transition to “disciplined democracy” has also been accompanied by a wave of privatisation measures where 271 state-owned companies have reportedly been sold to former head of the state, Than Shwe’s closest cronies such as Thay Zar, Zaw Zar, and Chit Khaing, the Myanmar Times reported. While the military conglomerates have got weakened in this process, Than Shwe’s informal influence has been consolidated.
Altogether, the influence of the military conglomerates in the economy remains considerable. The generals’ transition ensured a return to civilian rule without relinquishing the de facto military control of the government. The military would still remain the arbiter of power in the country, though it has created new political institutions that might develop some autonomy of their own in the future.
Even before the latest coup, the military’s withdrawal from power did not mean a retreat into the barracks, but rather a further institutionalisation of military control. The military has managed to establish a competitive authoritarian regime, in which it remained the arbiter of power.

History of Myanmar: Transformation from Military rule to Disciplined Democracy

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1613568906958" alt="China’s misadventure in the region called Central and Eastern Europe. CEE, CEEC, 17+1." style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>
For the first time, Chinese Communist Party premier, Xi Jinping has chaired the virtual meeting of 17+1 Summit between Central &amp; Eastern European (CEE) countries and China, instead of his distant number two, Li Keqiang.
Chinese state media called it a “pioneering feat of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”, but facts suggest otherwise. Long-delayed summit, growing division among CEE nations on Beijing’s increasing malicious geo-political activities, and frustrated CEE nations over China’s shallow promises on trade and investment are some of the instances showcasing that countries are losing confidence in China.
CEE group is facing ‘Promise fatigue’ from China on the accounts of unlevelled business playing field, and China not coming to keep up with its promises. EU claims that China may be implementing divide et impera – divide and rule – policy toward the EU through its investments in CEE nations. 12 EU nations are also a part of 17+1.
This year the summit witnessed absence from the head of states of six countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia in the state-level summit which was graced by Xi himself. These countries decided to send ministers instead.
The recent 17+1 summit can be seen as a clear setback for China, which commenced with high hopes to economically develop the less-developed region of Europe against their advanced western neighbours.
Almost ten years and one pandemic later, the scholars are claiming that this region will again be the battlefield for new Cold War with the mere difference of leading countries involved. The growing scepticism towards China in CEE countries is not the entirely the result of sudden rise of expansionist China, but of failing infrastructure projects one after another in the region, China’s unkept investment promises, and the Russia factor.
This episode of another China-CEE failing relationship highlights a widening split taking place in Central and Eastern Europe where many countries have a soberer assessment of engagement with China, and are carefully positioning themselves between Beijing and Washington amid the deepening rivalry.
<ins>What is 17+1?</ins>
China-CEE or China-CEEC (Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries) is an initiative by the CCP to stimulate trade and investment relations between China and 17 countries of CEE which are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The format of 17+1 (previously 16+1) mechanism was proposed almost 10 years ago, and was received with lot of enthusiasm &amp; hope on both the sides. China, which became the world’s largest manufacturer and second largest economy, aspired to be a great power which wanted to inject capital in the CEE region to build infrastructure, revive old factories, invest in human resources, and local projects that western investors tend to overlook.
This narrative created the competition among fellow countries to become the “China’s gateway to Europe” which paved the way for China–CEE summits. The Prime Minister-level summit aimed to fill a gap of cooperation aimed to facilitate the flow of investments and trade for the economic development of CEE nations along with establishing strategic partnership between China and regional countries was inaugurated in Poland in 2012.
China always promotes bookish definition about the 17+1 concept which seems like music whenever it falls on ears, but never has articulated its purpose. The loose and undefined concepts regarding the mechanism created numerous perspectives about the ‘purpose’.
For US, 17+1 mechanism was China’s new weapon to influence geopolitics of Central and Eastern European region through proposing lofty infrastructure projects, and using its soft &amp; hard power, together called as “Smart Power”, a term proposed by former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. For EU, 17+1 mechanism is formed to divide the union.
Therefore, both EU and US view the mechanism as a strategic intrusion of China into united Europe which pose serious security threats to region’s countries and their national interests. Suspicion approves when countries like Greece and Hungary, receiver of most China’s investments, have been blocking unfavourable EU resolutions on the China subject from past few years, causing fear inside EU that more countries will follow the suit.
On the contrary to above perspectives, it is just an annual summit featuring a plethora of unfulfilled promises and projects.
The CEE countries were in dire need of infrastructure and investments, and China’s intentions with 17+1 mechanism was to create an economic corridor between the China and CEE countries which would develop the region, facilitate China’s presence in the Europe and, and strengthen its bilateral connections, but China failed in juggling expectations and achievements.
The majority of Chinese investments were pouring only in six countries diplomatically close to China, namely Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. This created a huge imbalance among 17 CEE countries.
Thus, the initial years of optimism changed into growing scepticism when the reality of mechanism uncovered. All those hopeful and appealing years of promises, proposals, and headlines returned back to haunt Beijing when the other countries acknowledged that investments were not arriving consistently. Discontent towards Chinese companies and regime is growing rapidly.
Chinese companies have been criticised for financing projects using Chinese loans, and employing a predominantly Chinese workforce. This causes fears about the emergence of “debt trap” policy in Europe.
<ins>Case of Serbia, Hungary, and Romania</ins>
Labelled as “Chinese highway to nowhere”, Montenegro’s European Motorway XI links the Port of Bar with Serbia, which became the first victim of debt-trap increasing its debt-to-GDP ratio to 80 percent.
Serbia, which is one of the Chinese pillars in the 17+1 community, received a series of investments in infrastructure, industry, and energy sector. Railroad between Budapest and Belgrade proved to be a landmark for 17+1. Zemun-Borca Bridge, also known as the Pupin Bridge, was constructed by China Road and Bridge Corporation, and was inaugurated by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in 2014. The bridge was nicknamed as the ‘Friendship Bridge’ was China’s biggest investment of 260 million Euros in Europe on one project.
The project characterised China’s modus operandi regarding its investment abroad – heavy loan from a Chinese bank, a workforce which is at least half Chinese, and full involvement of Chinese companies in construction.
In energy sector, Kostolac Thermal Power Plant Station and the Smederevo Steel Plant received the Chinese investments.&nbsp;
Hungary is well-known for its traditional friendship with China which facilitated such investments in the form of Budapest-Belgrade railway, and the Huawei European Supply Center.
Although Hungary has not received much foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, it boasts a lot of 'firsts' as it is the first European country to sign an intergovernmental cooperation document with China on jointly promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The first to set up a BRI working group with China, as well as the first CEE country to establish a Renminbi (RMB) clearing bank, and issue bonds in RMB.
It is also the first CEE country to host an official agency of the Tourism Authority of China, and the first European country to implement bilingual education in Hungarian and Chinese.&nbsp;
Romania was also supposed to receive an important amount of Chinese investments, but nearly all of them are stuck in negotiation or have been cancelled. The Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant, the Rovinari Thermal Power Plant, and the Tarnita-Lapuşteşti Hydroelectric Power Plant are the three most important Chinese projects, two of which are still under negotiation. The only big Chinese investment in Romania is the Huawei Regional Support Center.
China lacked a long-term strategy for developing the CEE countries. China treated all the 17 countries as one unit – which they are definitely not – like the European single market, and considered them as monolith. It did not acknowledge their diversity of visions, policies, perspectives, or backgrounds because China entered into not-so-economically viable region to eventually just gain influence geopolitically. China’s aim was to stretch its muscles of money power to gain leverage against US in the ‘great game’.
<ins>The Russian Factor</ins>
China ignored the ‘Russian Factor’ as mostly all the countries in the CEE region have a communist past under the shadow of USSR, especially those on the eastern flank. From the security perspective, these countries fear Russia, especially after Moscow annexed Crimea back in 2014, which makes them prone to side with the United States.
Many countries did not even know the proper intentions of China regarding the 17+1 mechanism, and Beijing kept everyone in dark about the ‘purpose’ as mentioned above. Lack of communication about the goals created panic among members as the trade-war took off.
China’s malicious activities in the region, and the subsequent pandemic made 17+1 economically dead. Beijing also tried to inject with its “Vaccine diplomacy”. China simply failed to deliver on its economic, investment, and trade promises which made the 17+1 attractive in the first place, but Beijing did not whole-heartedly address this problem which increased the disappointment towards China in CEE countries.&nbsp;
When launched in 2012, the 17+1 mechanism was regarded as a Chinese tool to facilitate its access to the EU market. Over time, because the mechanism has failed to bring about promised outcomes, even China’s closest CEE friends have begun to rethink their relationship with China and the United States.
The changing perspectives of some 17+1 members may assuage the EU’s concern about China attempting to divide the Union as China seems to become less important for the CEE region. At the same time, the EU is in the process of changing its voting system regarding foreign policy decisions.
If there were a New Cold War between China and the United States, many EU countries from the CEE region might take a different position. This got demonstrated when many CEE countries allied on the US’ ‘Clean Network program’ with respect to the cyber policy to safeguard the privacy and data that could compromise national security against Chinese telecommunication giant, Huawei (on its 5G global rollout).
Tensions between China and the United States will continue to deepen even if they manage to reach a trade deal in future, owing to their competing geopolitical interests. Under the US global campaign, Huawei’s technology has become central to the concern of a potential “digital iron curtain”.
China is stuck in the middle of geopolitical and military tensions between US and Russia in the region which used to known as “other side of iron curtain” which today perceive Russia as a common threat. Economic prosperity will never be prioritised over survival and security of the State in the international system, as Liberalist seems to propound, and China’s failed adventure in CEE region making prospects where countries will cut tie from Beijing.

China’s misadventure in the region called Central and Eastern Europe

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1612959127830" alt="Biden’s chance to stabilise US-Iran relations post Trump-Era. Iran Nuclear deal and JCPOA" style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

After the turbulent four years of American foreign policy under Trump administration with high level of unpredictability that created havoc in the world politics, US President Biden has pledged to reverse several of the previous administration’s decisions, beginning with the Iran Nuclear Deal, popularly known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Not only Trump’s foreign policy, but also domestic policies were guided by Trumpism – a new theoretical ideology denoting Trump’s idiosyncratic actions without realising their detrimental effects. This mind-set forced the political scholars to denote the four years of trump in White House as Trump-Era, indicating that these four years caused as much damage to America’s foreign policy as it did to the established world order.
The unilateral withdrawal by former President Trump from JCPOA strained the already terrible relations between Iran and US, therefore, Biden’s path to restore the Obama-period nuclear deal would be extremely difficult.
President Biden is eyeing an urgent restoration of the Iran Nuclear Deal, while US’s new National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan has suggested that a faster timeline than the administration has previously outlined is being framed.
“We are going to have to address Iran’s other bad behaviour, malign behaviour, across the region, but from our perspective, a critical early priority has to be to deal with what is an escalating nuclear crisis as they move closer and closer to having enough fissile material for a weapon,” Sullivan said. “And we would like to make sure that we re-establish some of the parameters and constraints around the program that have fallen away over the course of the past two years,” he added.
<ins>What is JCPOA? A brief history</ins>
After the intensive and lengthy diplomatic talks for years amidst the continuous animosity between Iran and the western countries, at dawn of July 14, 2015 a news broke which everybody on either side of hemisphere were hoping. Final details of the JCPOA or Iran N-deal were finalised. The accord was notable in the history of nuclear proliferation, and the deal was considered an agreement that could change the dynamics in the Middle East.
It provided hope to citizens of the world that differences can only be resolved through diplomacy, and not by wars. One such citizen was Iran’s Foreign Minister Javed Zarif who had tweeted back in 2015, “#IranDeal is not a ceiling, but a solid foundation. We must now begin to build on it.”&nbsp;
The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), along with Germany – collectively known as P5 + 1.
It had gone into effect in January 2016, and imposed restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program. During the regime of former monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran had committed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, and even signed the Non-proliferation Treaty sponsored by Nixon administration.&nbsp;
Though after the overthrow of Reza Shah Regime, which was an ally of US in the Middle East as per the Baghdad Pact, and the subsequent 1979 Islamic revolution, which established Ruhollah Kheominei’s Islamic clergy regime, the leaders of Iran who were hard-liners against US and western powers on the ideological basis tried to secretly pursue the nuclear technology.
Under JCPOA terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program, and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief. Iran has suffered from a dizzying and complex set of international economic sanctions as punishment for its nuclear development by the western powers prior to the deal. The deal in the nutshell was that the sanctions would be lifted in exchange for the tight restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. The provisions of the deal formed as such that it would make functionally impossible for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon till the accord remains in place.

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1612959313444" alt="Biden’s chance to stabilise US-Iran relations post Trump-Era. Iran nuclear deal and JCPOA." style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

<ins>Trump’s JCPOA withdrawal</ins>
Riding on the anti-Iran and anti-JCPOA rhetoric, Donald Trump campaigned on the promises to dismantle the Iran nuclear accord, referring to it as “the worst deal ever.” An electoral victory in 2016 allowed the Trump administration to fulfil its promise, and thus, it changed the dynamics of Middle East for the worse.
In May 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear accord, thanks to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu consistent lobbying against the deal from the beginning. Regional players like Israel and Saudi Arabia provided a strong backing to Trump administration for the withdrawal from the deal which would further weaken Iran’s influence in the region.
“This was a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made,” a grim-faced Mr. Trump said in an 11-minute address from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House. “It did not bring calm, it did not bring peace, and it never will,” he added.

<img src="https://discussion.policharcha.in/1612959398758" alt="Biden’s chance to stabilise US-Iran relations post Trump-Era. Iran nuclear deal and JCPOA." style="float:none;height: auto;width: auto"/>

These steps in compliance with accord foreclosed the Iran’s pathways to build nuclear weapons. Trump insisted that the limits placed on the Iran’s nuclear fuel production according to the deal were inadequate. The administration presented no evidence that Iran was not complying with its obligations, but the former president called the deal as “worst deal ever” due to the couple of reasons. Firstly, Trump had a contention with the provisions of ‘sunset clauses’ – the deal is not permanent, the limits were to expire in 2030. Secondly, the deal does not address the threat of Iran’s ballistic missiles development or its malign behaviour in the region. Iran supports militant groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon which is principal enemy of the Israel, a known US ally.
<ins>Consequences of withdrawal</ins>&nbsp;
After withdrawing from agreement, US re-instated all the sanctions it had waived as part of the nuclear accord. Therefore, US re-impose oil sanctions, and new sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran, crippling the national economy while Iran complied with provisions of the deal and kept restricted its development of nuclear capability for next one year.
Iran accused the United States of reneging on its commitments, and faulted Europe for submitting to US’ unilateralism. The withdrawal not only increased geopolitical tensions with Iran, but also strained the transatlantic relations with European allies, undermining their positions in the deal which came into effect to hold Iran accountable.&nbsp;
Trump’s strategy to confront Iran, and bring it back to the table to negotiate the total dismantle of its nuclear program – eliminating sunset clauses – and address its malign activities was to impose maximum pressure to gain maximum leverage ahead of diplomatic discussions while avoiding a military entanglement in the future. This is popularly known as ‘maximum pressure’ strategy.&nbsp;
JCPOA provided a highly intrusive inspection regime to check Iran’s compliance with the agreement, but Trump’s maximum pressure campaign has failed to produce concessions from Iran, let alone bring it to the negotiation table for discussion on the Iran’s other malign activities.
The nuclear deal provided the P5+1 with greater inspection and accountability tools to ensure Iran is not foraging on the path of building nuclear weapons. Provisions of the deal would have made almost impossible for Iran to violate the agreement without facing serious blow from all the countries including European powers, which are still the participants in the deal. The deal would also have given greater international legitimacy to US to use hard power against Iran if the latter had resumed the nuclear program.
Pressure from multilateral sanctions successfully brought Iran to the negotiating table, but US retaliatory unilateral sanctions have failed to produce a replacement agreement or stop Iran from ramping up its nuclear program.
In response to the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, and subsequent re-instatement of nuclear and other sanctions, Iran has steadily reduced its compliance with the JCPOA.
Iran increased its uranium enrichment, advanced centrifuges, and stockpile size. Moreover, maximum pressure has failed to stop Iran from supporting proxies that further destabilise the region.
The provocations from both sides increased the tensions between Iran and US. Many political scholars had even predicted a Middle East war after the tanker blast incident in Persian Gulf in mid-2019. The list of Iranian provocations in the same year also goes long, beginning from the downing of an American drone, mine attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz, and a cruise missile strike on Saudi oil facilities.
On the nuclear front, Iran’s slow but steady effort to shrink its breakout timeline raises alarm bells in Western capitals without provoking an American or Israeli military strike on its nuclear facilities.&nbsp;
The assassination of Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian military commander, in January 2020 was the peak of these provocations on the either side which followed the downward spiralling effect pushing the region to the brink of a catastrophic war amidst the coronavirus pandemic. Subsequently, the assassination of eminent scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November worked as a fuel in the confrontation.&nbsp;
<ins>Conclusion</ins>
Despite the welter of conflicting actions and statements coming from senior Iranian leaders in recent times, it seems that Tehran would welcome a quick return to the JCPOA by the incoming Biden administration.
However, Iran appears to be signalling that the opportunity to do so will be brief, and if the United States does not immediately resume compliance with the terms of the original agreement, that window will close quickly and perhaps permanently. Although such compliance must be verified, a US return to the JCPOA is the best way to incentivise Iran to comply with the deal.
The Biden administration’s best approach will be to pursue complementary near-term and long-term strategies simultaneously to bring Iran back into compliance with the limits on its nuclear program, while raising the stakes of Tehran’s adventurism in the region and paving the way to a follow-on agreement.
The JCPOA offers the best path for the United States to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons, and it was working until the withdrawal. The reality today is much starker, and Iran is closer to building a nuclear weapon. The steps Iran has taken in violation of the JCPOA, however, are reversible — Iran can return to compliance with the deal.
The only way to achieve another agreement in the future — including one that addresses Iran’s ballistic missile program and other security threats Iran poses — is for the United States to return to the JCPOA and implement its part of the deal. Re-joining the JCPOA advances US national security, restores US credibility, and should be a top priority for the Biden administration.

Biden’s chance to stabilise US-Iran relations post Trump-Era

One year has gone so fast, and though initially it felt like the impact of the pandemic will be devastating for India, we are sitting at a much more comfortable position.
From capacity building in our medical infrastructure, to confidence building in our vaccination programme, we have come a long long way in just a span of one year.
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Everybody came together to fight the virus and minimise its effects. Special thanks to the health care workers, and frontline heroes who not only gave us a chance to survive this adversity, but also positioned us at the lead in the fight against Covid.
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Economy took a hit, but is steadily getting back on track. Migrants workers were the ones to face the brunt of the disorder that prevailed earlier. The migrants' situation could have been handled more efficiently.
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What are your thoughts? What we could have done differently? Are you happy with the efforts of the Government? How did the pandemic changed the dynamics of the working culture? Anything else you want to comment about?
Be sure to add your views in the comments.

On this day last year, the first case suspected for Covid-19 infection was reported in India in Thrissur district of Kerala.

<a href="/hashtag/BJP">#BJP</a> is working really hard in West <a href="/hashtag/Bengal">#Bengal</a>, can they win?

What do you think about the upcoming #Bengal assembly elections?

Already world is dealing with Covid19.

But China is using this 'opportunity' to engage in creating complications across its borders, whether land with India or sea, in South China Sea.

Now it has fulfilled Bangladesh's long term demand of reduction in tariffs, and that too by 97%! The timing couldnt be perfect.

Where is China headed to?

How realistic is our this thought that we should Boycott Chinese Products in response to the Dragon's aggression across the border?

Wallet vs Bullet

As we all are aware about the "Vande Bharat Mission" Exercise, known as the World's biggest expatriation exercise of the world, taking off today. What ae your opinions on this?
Do you think this is the correct step, correct timing to start something like this as we already know that the COVID19 cases in India are soaring rapidly. This expatriation might bolster the Pandemic and could give catastorphic results. I am sharing some of the main points below.
1. The mission is all about bringing stranded Indians from abroad.
2. 64 flights over 1 week to repatriatestranded Indians.
3. 14,800 Indians from 12 countries to be brought back in phase1.

Is it the correct step and time for THE REPATRIATION EXERCISE of the Indians from U.A.E?? 

would like to know what you feel is the setting root for such crimes?

I am more than active on twitter and it has actually helped me to find out more from different perspectives and do research. In India right now internet is provided at a very cheap rate for everyone , so less than thankfully many labourers have the connection. Now a new trend which has commenced is low grade small movies from few production houses like fliz,gupchup etc where in they have started to show similar adult movies or porn being a welcomed route. It just doesn't need any acting skills and their is nothing in it except of the scenes and they are readily available over the net. Mixed with the languages used in songs and movies along with individual albums these days, that is degrading the humans and more so the females.
Isn't it the time to get in some strict actions in place now as even many such other atrocities like domestc violence and rapes have always played a key role in degrading the life of woman in our nation. ?

Boys locker room

There has been a lot of discussion on <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmcares?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/pmcares"><a href="/hashtag/pmcares"><a href="/hashtag/pmcares">#pmcares</a></a></a></a> .Some say it is a replica of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmnrf?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/PMNRF"><a href="/hashtag/PMNRF">#PMNRF</a></a></a> and others are questioning its transparency and use.
Some Facts:
1. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmnrf?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank">#PMNRF</a> was introduced to bring back people displaced from Pakistan and contribute a small portion towards medical treatment. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmcaresfund?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/pmcaresfund">#pmcaresfund</a></a> is just about <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/covid19?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/covid19"><a href="/hashtag/covid19">#covid19</a></a></a>.
2. Relief funds set up state government don't fall under CSR Donations - <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/companiesact?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/companiesact">#companiesact</a></a> Act,2013. Ironical when the party which placed it now questions it knowing that it will need an amendment to change it.

3.Contribution of funds to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/sdma?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/SDMA">#SDMA</a></a> will be taken as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/csr?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/CSR"><a href="/hashtag/CSR">#CSR</a></a></a> Expenditure. Why are some states complaining and politicising it rather than asking the corporates to contribute under it and avail <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/csr?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank">#CSR</a> Benefits under prevailing law??
4. States get 41% share of the revenue under 15th Finance Commission so it's time they chip in because the way I see, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmcares?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank">#pmcares</a> is doing what it is supposed to.
5. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/pmcares?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank">#pmcares</a> will be audited by independent auditors. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-cares-to-be-audited-by-independent-auditors/articleshow/75112792.cms?fbclid=IwAR0UARVDu33NvYzBfgDSwwyDeGFBtcuXcIydiFX9vVbbwLTZon8BF5TL_lA" target="_blank">https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-cares-to-be-audited-by-independent-auditors/articleshow/75112792.cms</a>

Isn't it high time we forget the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/religion?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/religion">#religion</a></a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/party?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank"><a href="/hashtag/party">#party</a></a> based bias and unite as a nation. Or does it require more <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/covid19?source=note&epa=HASHTAG" target="_blank">#covid19</a> deaths for us to finally stop politicising everything?

When will we unite as a nation by keep religion and politics aside?

India is one of the fastest growing major economies in the world, has the largest young workforce, most densely populated country (and the largest consumer market).&nbsp;

BUT is it sufficient?

As, on the other side:
1. We are still lacking the basic infrastructure to support large scale manufacturing. As we are still largely dependent on our service sector and primary sector, and have over the years grown in these two primarily ,leaving our manufacturing capabilites underdeveloped ?

2. Is our young huge workforce "skilled" also?

3. Do we have simple Economic, Labour &amp; Corporate laws in place to permit easy entry, exit &amp; working of the firms/corporate?

4. Are our Income tax laws favourable for foreign countries for setting up manufacturing facilities in India?

5. Do we have proper transportation network for movement of goods within india and for export outside india? Like: Dedicated freight corridors, Developed Ports, ICDs (Inland Container Depots) etc.

6. Are our export clearances easy &amp; whether our FTP(Foreign Trade Policy) is really making impact for increasing exports?

On this day last year, the first case suspected for Covid-19 infection was reported in India in Thrissur district of Kerala.

What do you think about the upcoming #Bengal assembly elections?

Where is China headed to?

Wallet vs Bullet

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